The Transformation of Collective Security
Security is primarily an issue of a nation’s relations with other states or a group of states. This relationship among states which feel threatened by each other is exposed to the security dilemma. 6 It is generally argued that the security of nations cannot be defined in general terms, nor can it be determined objectively. 7 Definitions depend on states’ perception about threats and safety. Therefore, “on security no precise definition has ever been achieved and probably never will be”. 8 “There appears to be almost a studied vagueness about the precise definition of terms such as security’. This complexity is also related to the problem of which areas of life are the subject of security. In this regard, theoretical debate occurs between two views of security approach to security, the traditionalists, it is argued that identifying security issues is easy as they equate security with military issues and the use of force. 10 Traditionalists also strongly oppose the widening of security studies, as by such logic, issues like pollution, disease, child abuse or economic 5 Till, pop. Cit. , in note 1, p. 96.
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The security dilemma refers to the notion that a state’s efforts to increase its security by threatening another state, which then responds with steps to increase its own security, paradoxically erodes the first state’s security. See C. A. Checkup, ‘The Case for Collective Security, in Downs, G. W. (De), Collective Security beyond the Cold War, ( USA: University of Michigan Press, 1994), up. 41-69. 7 A. V. Sausage, The Security of Western Europe, (London: Sherwood Press, 1985), p. 2. 8 C. Then, “Problems of Transition” in J. Alfred et al, Europe in Western Alliance, (London: MacMillan Press, 1988), p. 7. 9 G. Edwards and B. Burrows, The Defense of Western Europe , (Norfolk: Butterscotch, 1982), p. 91. 10 B. Abuzz et al, Security , A New Framework for Analysis, , ( London: Lonely Runnier pub. 1998), p. 3. 6 3 recessions could be viewed as threats to security. Here we see that the traditionalist view regards only military and political subjects as the focus of studies in the security field. Yet, this approach has entered an impasse and led to increasing dissatisfaction in explaining the events taking place in the international arena later on.
As pointed out by one of the proponents of the wider approach, this dissatisfaction was stimulated first by the rise of the economic and environmental agendas in international relations during the sass and the sass and later by the rise of concerns with identity issues and transnational crime during the sass. 11 Today it is obvious that this narrow definition does not fully cover the parameters of the new security environment in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, the political and intellectual climate has changed.
Studies in this regard have articulated very different views about how to define the concept of security. The narrow definition of security tends to focus on material capabilities and the use of military force by states. This, however, contrasts with the distinctions among military, political, economic, social, and environmental security threats. 12 Thus, with this transforming understanding of what security means today, the advocates of the wider approach concentrate on discussing the dynamics of security in five sectors, that is, military, political, economic, environmental and societal. This methodological framework also seems to better serve distinguishing security issues as “hard” and ” soft”. 14 Faced with such a unavoidable due to the different analytical perspectives on the issue. Yet, in view of the presence of security risks of different natures, it is, at least from the practical point of view, a fact that security at present should be regarded as not merely, or even mainly, a matter 11 Ibid. , p. 2. P. J. Austenite (De), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in Word Politics , (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), up. -9. 13 See the introduction in Suzan, pop. It. , up. 1-21. 14 Generally speaking, security issues requiring military options and relating to defense are considered ‘hard’ ones whereas others that require non-military measures such as conflict prevention are regarded as ‘soft’. But this distinction today appears to be less relevant in view of events and experience in world affairs. See for details M. T. Clare and D. C. Thomas (De) , World Security, ( New York: SST. Martin’s Press, 1991). 12 of military policy, but of broader economic and political policies.
For threats to security are not necessarily of a military nature, but they might derive from various there reasons. In view of the above, one can draw two main conclusions. Irrespective of which subjects are to be considered in dealing with the security concept, it seems evident that security is about preservation of the existence of states. And, in this preservation effort, the military component is always present even if as a last resort. Similarly, threat perception and the nature of such perceived threats are important in determining whether and how the perceived threat should be viewed as a matter of security.
This brings us to the concept of collective security. Here, similar to the conceptual problem in defining security, a precise definition of collective security mains elusive. Not only do definitions differ,which is bound to happen in public debate and scholarly discourse, but also some directly contradict each other. 18 In simple terms, collective security is related to efforts by a group of states to act together in order to better preserve their own security. The term has been used to describe everything from loose alliance systems to any period of history in which wars do not take place.
This wide Serialization, in the words of Suzan, means a process by which ” the issue in question is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bonds of political procedure”. See Suzan, pop. Cit. , up. 23-24. 16 Ibid. , p. 24. 17 J. C. Garnett, “Introduction: Conflict and Security in the new world order”, in M. J. Davis, (De), Security Issues in the Post-Cold War, (I-J: Edward Legal Pub. Ltd, 1996), p. 10. 18 G. W. Downs, ‘Beyond the Debate on Collective Security, in Downs, G. W. De), Collective Security beyond the Cold War, ( USA: University of Michigan Press, 1994), up. 1-17. Spectrum is also due to the nature of security threats. States ally to increase their security against perceived threats. 19 In any particular balance of power system, there are usually groups of states that share to some extent an assessment of those threats. States face two kinds of threats in general. 20 The first is usually the reason for which states Join their forces in the first place, I. E. An external threat from a potential aggressor who is not part of the group.
The second threat is of a more insidious but often Just as dangerous nature, namely, an internal threat from a member of the group itself that betrays its friends and uses force against them. The first form of collective security is best illustrated by the alliance system. An alliance functions as a collective body that defends its members from security threats directed from outside. Thus it includes the concept of collective defense as well. Moreover, although an alliance is focused on external threats, the security is collective for its members.
On the other hand, the best illustration of security arrangements countering internal threats coming from members of a collective security body is the “security community’. 21 Collective security rests on the notion of one for all and all for one. Here, the question of why states come together for collective security can be argued is clear enough. It is because they share the same threat perceptions against which they think they will be better-off if they act together. Yet, the question of how they perceive the same threat is not that clear. This brings us to the issue of identity-building.
Identification is considered a social concept. 22 The process of identity formation is of a kind that develops within a social unit. “Any identification requires a distinction Just as any 19 See K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, ( Reading: Addison & Wesley, 1979) and also S. Walt, The Origins of Alliance , ( Ithaca: Cornel, 1987) 20 See for details S. Weber, ‘ Does NATO have a future 7, in Crawford, B. (De), The Future 21 This concept was first introduced by Van Wagner, and later in 1957 developed by Karl Deutsche with theoretical arguments . For the views of Dutch, see particularly E.
Adler, ‘ Rupee’s New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security Community, and P. W. Schultz, ‘ Competing for European Security: The SEC, NATO and the European Community in a Changing International Environment’, both in Crawford, B. (De), The Future of European Security, (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1992). 22 A. N. Hurdles, “Bravura KimГ¤inn LOL#lam eve TГјark Gimlet” in Atilt Realer (De) TГјrisky eve Bravura, (Ankara: image Active, 1997) p. 18. 6 distinction necessitates some identification” 23 . This brings us to the self/other dichotomy.
The self is identified in relation to its position visa-Г¤-visa the other 24 . In other words, all identities exist only with their otherness. “Without the other, the self actually cannot know either itself or the world because meaning is created in discourse where consciousness meets”. 25 Identification is of an exclusionary nature for the non-identified. In other words, in the identification of a group of people as a community, this unit is externalities of or disassociated from the values, myths, symbols, attitudes and mores of those (non-identified) with whom the unit does not identify itself. 6 It is also argued that the existence or the perception of threats from the other inevitably strengthens the identity of the self. 27 The formation of the self is inextricably intertwined with the formation of its others and a failure to regard the others in their own right must necessarily have repercussions for the formation of the self. 28 Identity is the key element of a cognitive region. Shared self-definitions create internalized norms that allow people from different countries to know each other better and thus respond more effectively to the common concerns.
What constitutes the basis for collective security arrangements is therefore the mutual responsiveness developed out of answers to the questions of “who I am” and “who the other is”. In other words, it is the collective identity, which lays the ground for a sound collective security. The importance of identities can thus be summarized as follows: common identities help to establish a security whose existence, I. E. Elective security, proves that members share common identities. A. N.
Hurdles, International Relations and the Philosophy of History: a Civilization Approach, ( London: MacMillan, forthcoming), p. 105. 24 K. Krause, “Critical Theory and Security Studies”, Cooperation and Conflict, Volvo (33)3, 1998, p. 312.. 25 Hurdles, pop. Cit. , in note 22, p. 107. 27 Hurdles, , pop. Cit. , in note 21, p. 21 . 28 Neumann, pop. Cit. , p. 35. 7 In view of the foregoing, one can easily understand that collective identities and shared values as well as shared understandings as regards threat perceptions are of significant importance for the creation of a workable collective security arrangement.
The identity issue entered into International Relations full fledged with the critical theories, such as “constructivism”. However, “mainstream” approaches 29 also acknowledge identity. But, how it differs from the constructivist approach is that it presumes to know priori what the self-being is defined as. The state as a unit is assumed to have a single identity, across time and space whereas constructivism assumes that the selves, or identities, of states are variable, they likely depend on historical, cultural, political and social context 30 .
Accordingly, as regards the object of security, the constructivist approach questions how the object of security is constructed according to threat perceptions. Here, the argument that discourses of threat are constitutive of the object to be secured relates to the question of how such threats are identified. In view of the foregoing, one can see that constructivism helps better explain collective security formations that are constitutive of collective identities. Thus, sound collective security arrangements are forms of collective identity that exclude each other on the basis of their distinctiveness.
Here, it can be argued that those security regimes could not establish a collective identity against a common threat. In other words, the selves in hose organizations did not come together against a common “other”. In the Cold War era, the “other” was the East for the West and vice versa, although members of both Blocs remained in the same global security regime, the I-JNI. Therefore, their stay in the UN was not due to the creation of a common identity but due to a felt need. IMPACT OF THE POST-COLD WAR The post-Cold War has had a considerable impact on this state of affairs.
The end of the Cold War, which for almost half a century had been the symbol of division in Europe, was marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall on October 3rd 1989. The fall of the Berlin wall meant also the collapse of the ideological walls which had divided Europe for so many years. The end of the Cold War even raised questions regarding the necessity of NATO as military alliances normally dissolve once their common enemy has been defeated. However, , 31 See for details, particularly A. Bennett, and J.
Leopold, “Reinventing Collective Security After the Cold War”, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 18, Issue 2, 1993. 32 Ibid. With the rise of non-conventional and asymmetric security threats this was proven not to be the case 33 . What is new in this sense is the effect of globalization on these threats. Today, in a world where things have increasingly become more transnational and interdependent, owing to the effects of globalization, any incident in a country or in region, be it a terrorist act or an ethnic conflict, poses threats to other areas due to the domino effect.
As a corollary to this, threats that transcend borders happen to affect security more rapidly, more severely in an ever-expanding magnitude with spill-over effects. These threats inevitably necessitate collective responses as they affect almost all states in one way or another. In such an environment, Europe in particular and the world in general have dinettes several hot conflicts and wars in Just one decade in the post-Cold War era, which amounts to more than occurred in the whole course of the Cold War years.
The European continent, which had been free from wars since the end of World War II, once again became a continent of conflict and death with a wars that erupted in its very midst, like in the territories of the former Yugoslavia or in its vicinity, or like the Caucasus or elsewhere like in the Middle East, I. E. The Gulf war. In view of this, one can argue that the basic premises of mainstream scholarship, such as anarchical setting, power politics based on national interests, etc. , are still present in the world affairs. True, mainstream scholarship failed to anticipate the end of the Cold War.
But, the world order, which has replaced the Cold War era, still proves the validity of mainstream scholarship. States act in pursuit of preservation of their interests and of protection of their 33 Asymmetric threat is defined as a threat that can cause harm in bigger magnitude than its size. Such threats vary from international terrorism, ethnic conflicts and religious fundamentalism through organized crime, drug trafficking, and proliferation f weapons of mass destruction to mass migrations, environmental disasters, poverty etc. See Irked, S. , “11 EllГјl 2001: Terrorizing Yen Milady”, Strategic Animal, Sally 18, Skim 2001.
Asymmetric threat is also defined as a threat that does not follow the rules of fair warfare including surprise attacks, as well as warfare with weapons used in an unconventional manner. See www. Rand. Org/news links/terrorism. .NET. 10 security in the face of both conventional and non-conventional security threats. However, the main question here is how they gather support from other states for such policies and how legitimacy is attained for them. In fact, the turnaround effects of such security threats help states gather the support of like-minded states and act collectively to protect their security against such threats.
Collective security arrangements have been seriously proposed after every large- scale war, such as the Napoleonic Wars, World War l, and World War II. The end of the Cold War followed the same path both in academic and state circles. In this regard, naturally the I-IN, being the only global organization for collective security, has been called upon several times. In the post-Cold War era, the UN Security Council has adopted a series of resolutions availing itself of the right to humanitarian through a number of experiences as witnessed in various wars and fights such as that of the Gulf, Bosnia and Somalia. 4 Despite this gradual progress in fulfilling its task of collective security, the UN faced a deadlock during the Spooks crisis in 1999. Due to Russia and China’s objection to a military operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the UN could not reach a decision authorizing the formation of a military force with the Security Council mandate and this implicitly left it up to NATO to take the responsibility . In light of these one can see that even in the post-Cold War era the UN system has maintained the inertia it derives from its organizational set-up.
This can be attributed to the following: In the post-Cold War era, although one of the Blocs disappeared, it was evident that at least the old leader of the East , I. E. Russia on the one hand and the USA together with the rest of the Western Bloc on the other, continued to regard each other as “other”. This was because they have not been able create a collective identity (self), as they could not define a common threat (other) either. See for details C. Gaucherie, “International Law and the War in Spooks”, Survival, , Volume 41, No: 2, Summer 1999.
POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ERA The world that embarked on a new millennium with these important shifts in international affairs in general and in the collective security field in particular, was unable to avoid the tragedy of September 1 lath. The terrorist attacks of September 1 1 have changed many, if not all, parameters in world affairs, and has important repercussions for security in a variety of ways and the approach to collective security is no exception to this.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks, NATO allies lined up Enid the US and in an unprecedented display of support and solidarity they invoked, on 12 September 2001, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of the Alliance, the core clause of collective defense, for the first time in the history of the Alliance. 35 This decision seems to have constituted a dramatic shift in the conceptualization of what forms hard and soft security issues. First, it was bitterly confirmed that terrorism is one of the most dangerous non-conventional asymmetric security threats.
Similarly, it was also confirmed that terrorists can easily access weapons of ass destruction. More importantly, with the invocation of Article 5 and the military operation directed against the al-Qaeda terrorist network and its sanctuary the Taliban regime, it has become clear that the fight against terrorism, which was always regarded as a matter of soft security, would also require hard security measures, including military ones, in the post-September 1 1 era. In this context, one can argue that the September 11 terrorist attacks have provided a conducive atmosphere for the creation of a new “other”, I. E. Common enemy. This was