Background of 1989 Salary Structure Review
As a result, it will become increase a common for a single employee to receive portions of compensation based on all 3 contingencies and decrease the portion provided as job-based pay only. It should be concluded, from what has been said above, that ‘pay for the job’ and ‘pay for the person’ and ‘pay for output’ are not mutually exclusive. In normal situation, if the staff performs well, they will be received what they hope or what they expect to get provided by the department1. Since this incentive system is not conducted by staff working period of time or their experience, therefore the self-motivation of the staff can be achieved.
There's a specialist from your university waiting to help you with that essay topic for only $13.90/page Tell us what you need to have done now!
( why motivate? ) In the private sector, once the employee has good performance, the person may have promotion opportunities or cash bonus. The following serves as an example: $254 million bonus was given to the staff in the Hong Kong Exchange due to well performance in 2007. However, under public context, the promotion opportunities are limited in the government department, and the profit sharing concept is not existed. The staff may only enjoy a progression up the pay range by annual increments, but the reward depends on time only, not based on his or her actual performance, so the arrangement is not suitable for motivating the staff.
Implementation Problems Although there are some merits (what merits? )of the performance-related pay system, the government didn’t practice the system. The problem resolves itself into the following four issues which needed to prepare for practicing the performance-based reward system. To begin with, we need to measure the performance by a fair and reliable way, so that the staff can be appraised if they have good performance. But in the reality, the issue is always subjective, and the system result in disputes and thus staff management problems.
Then, not every staff can have equal opportunities to perform. To take a simple example, not every policeman or fireman get equal opportunities to participate in the core operation. Moreover, there may be some mismatching of the human resources. For example, a staff is good at accounting. Unluckily, he or she is ordered to work for the production department, so that how can he perform well? Thirdly, to implement this pay system (WT? ) in the public sector, different forms of the performance-pay package are needed.
Since there are many different departments, grades and ranks in the public sector, there should need various packages to suit the circumstances. In the sense that means no one criterion is suitable for all dimensions. The question now arises : is it fair? Lastly, this pay system only focuses on high-flyers (1989, Report No. 23). The average performers are neglected because only the high-flyers have rewarded in this system. However, their contributions of the every performer are also essential for the departments or organizations.
It is important to note that without those performers, a department cannot operate effectively and distribute a good result. Pilot Scheme on Team-based Performance Rewards in Civil service If we understand the four problems mentioned before, we would be a step closer to them in connection with the pilot scheme. In the end of 2001, a pilot scheme on team-based performance rewards was launched by the HKSAR government which the objective of the initiative is to test out the feasibility and practicability of introducing performance-based rewards in the civil service.
Pilot Scheme Design In order to reinforce the behaviours required for effective teamwork and achieve sustainable improvements in the associated outcome, six departments were volunteered to participate and design their own scheme. The scheme was designed to be team-based. No more than 15% of the teams included in a pilot scheme can receive the team reward which the rewards would be one-off. The arrangement was set to motivate the staff keep well performance.